Chained Credit Contracts and Financial Accelerators by Naohisa Hirakata et al.
 
 









INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES 
 
BANK OF JAPAN 
 
2-1-1 NIHONBASHI-HONGOKUCHO 




You can download this and other papers at the IMES Web site: 
http://www.imes.boj.or.jp 
 
Do not reprint or reproduce without permission. 
Chained Credit Contracts and Financial Accelerators 
 
 
Naohisa Hirakata, Nao Sudo, and Kozo Ueda   
 

























NOTE:  IMES Discussion Paper Series is circulated in 
order  to  stimulate  discussion  and  comments.  Views 
expressed in Discussion Paper Series are those of 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the Bank of Japan or the Institute for Monetary 
and Economic Studies.   IMES Discussion Paper Series 2009-E-30 
November 2009 
 
Chained Credit Contracts and Financial Accelerators 
 
Naohisa Hirakata *, Nao Sudo **, and Kozo Ueda ***   
 
Abstract 
Based on the financial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999), we develop a 
dynamic general equilibrium model for a chain of credit contracts in which 
financial intermediaries (hereafter FIs) as well as entrepreneurs are subject to credit 
constraints. Financial intermediation takes place through chained-credit contracts, 
lending from the market to FIs, and from FIs to entrepreneurs. Calibrated to U.S. 
data, our model shows that the chained credit contracts enhance the financial 
accelerator effect, depending on the net worth distribution across sectors: (1) our 
model reinforces the effects of the net worth shock and the technology shock, 
compared with a model that omits the FIs’ credit friction à la Bernanke et al. 
(1999); (2) the sectoral shock to FIs has a greater impact than the sectoral shock to 
entrepreneurs; and (3) the redistribution of net worth from entrepreneurs to FIs 
reduces the amplification of the technology shock. The key features of the results 
arise from the asymmetry of the two borrowing sectors: smaller net worth and 
larger bankruptcy costs of FIs relative to those of entrepreneurs. 
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A large number of empirical studies suggest that declines of ￿nancial intermediaries￿
(hereafter FIs) net worth generates a macroeconomic downturn (Peek and Rosengren,
1997; 2000; Calomiris and Mason, 2003; Ashcraft, 2005). Because FIs tighten their
loans to ￿rms as their credit conditions deteriorate, and the ￿rms in the economy cannot
conduct their projects without ￿nancing them, the shock to the FI is propagated and
ampli￿ed to the real economy. The recent ￿nancial crisis starting in 2007 con￿rms the
importance of this channel. Declines in asset prices have damaged the balance sheets of
the major FIs drastically. Consequently, the interbank market has failed to function and
the spread between riskless rates and interbank lending rates has widened. This made it
more di¢ cult for FIs to borrow funds from the interbank market, and in turn, for ￿rms
to borrow funds from the FIs. Aggregate investment has dropped, and the real economy
in many countries has fallen into a deep recession.
From a policy perspective, the net worth (or capital) of the borrowing sectors, es-
pecially that of the FI sector, has become an important policy target in many of the
governmental initiatives conducted during the ￿nancial crisis. For example, the U.S.
government has injected capital to distressed large ￿nancial institutions.
Despite the importance of FIs￿net worth, studies using dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models have focused more on the non-￿nancial ￿rms￿net worth
rather than the FIs￿net worth.1 In Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) (hereafter
BGG), one of the workhorse models, for example, they consider the case where only the
entrepreneurs are credit constrained. There, the net worth of the entrepreneurial sector
a⁄ects the agency problem of the credit contract, and helps to propagate and amplify
the adverse shock hitting the economy (￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect). However, the BGG
model ignores the fact that FIs are credit constrained, creating another source of the
agency problem. In their setting, FIs are competitive agents that have zero net worth,
so that they play no role in the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect.
In this paper, we extend the BGG model by incorporating credit-constrained FIs.
In this economy, ￿nancial intermediation takes place through chained credit contracts.
FIs make loans to the entrepreneurs, but the loans are ￿nanced by the borrowings from
the market, in addition to the FIs￿own net worth. The entrepreneur is also credit
constrained and ￿nances his/her investment project using his/her own net worth and
borrowings from the FIs. Agency problems exist in both of the two borrowing contracts.
Consequently, the external ￿nance premium for entrepreneurs depends on FIs￿net worth
and entrepreneurial net worth.
Using the static version of the model, we ￿rst study how the net worth of FIs and
entrepreneurs a⁄ect the two credit contracts, and how these two credit contracts together
a⁄ect the aggregate investment decisions. Because the credit contracts are chained, the
agency problems in the two credit contracts work complementarily. The supply of funds
1Also see the discussions in Allen (2001) and Gorton and Winton (2003).
2to entrepreneurs is squeezed if either of the two contracts is severely constrained.
Next, we study the implication on the model dynamics, based on calibration to the
U.S. economy. To illustrate the relationship between the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect and
the net worth of FIs and entrepreneurs, we conduct three experiments. We ￿rst compare
our model with a model that abstracts from the FIs￿credit friction ￿ la BGG. Because
credit contracts are chained and they work complementarily, our model, in general, prop-
agates and ampli￿es the adverse shocks more than a model where only entrepreneurial
credit frictions exist. Second, we compare how a shock to the FI sector and a shock to the
entrepreneurial sector are propagated to the aggregate economy. We ￿nd that a sectoral
shock to FIs is propagated more than a shock to the entrepreneurs. This re￿ ects the fact
that the agency problem in the FI sector and the entrepreneurial sector are asymmetric.
In the United States, FIs have smaller net worth than the entrepreneurs, and the cost
associated with FIs￿bankruptcy is higher than that of entrepreneurs, resulting in the
former facing a more severe agency problem. Consequently, a shock to the FI sector has
a larger impact on aggregate variables. Lastly, we examine how the ￿￿nancial accelerator
e⁄ect￿associated with the aggregate shock can change, when we arti￿cially change the
net worth distribution. Taking the other parameters pertaining to the credit markets as
given, we ￿nd that the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect can be reduced, if appropriate amount
of net worth is distributed from entrepreneurs to FIs.
Our model is constructed with reference to two lines of literature. The ￿rst strand
focuses on the credit friction associated with the entrepreneurs (BGG; Kiyotaki and
Moore, 1997; Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno, 2004 [hereafter CMR]). The second
strand considers the credit friction of the FIs (Bernanke and Blinder 1988). Extending
the idea of Bernanke and Blinder (1988), Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) investigate
the role of a banking sector that produces loans and deposits according to a production
function with inputs of monitoring e⁄ort and collateral while they assume a constant
ratio of base money to deposits. Van den Heuvel (2008) analyzes the welfare e⁄ects of
regulatory requirements for FIs￿capital. Gerali et al. (2008) and Dib (2009) discuss
monopolistically competitive banks in deposit and loan markets. Gertler and Karadi
(2009) construct a model in which depositors can force FIs into bankruptcy but cannot
recover all of the FIs￿assets.
As we explained above, we incorporate the two types of frictions into the model. In
this sense, our model is similar to the work of Chen (2001), Aikman and Paustian (2006),
and Meh and Moran (2004), who use quantitative extensions of the model of Holmstrom
and Tirole (1997). However, there are three notable di⁄erences between their models
and ours, with respect to the role of net worth.2 First, their models are built upon
2Furthermore, in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), it is entrepreneurs who optimize contracts between
FIs and investors. Entrepreneurs maximize their expected pro￿ts subject to the zero pro￿t conditions
of other participants of the credit market. However because it is assumed that all projects are perfectly
correlated ex post, FIs can earn positive pro￿ts if a project succeeds. In our model, FIs are monopolistic
and it is the FIs who optimize contracts between FIs and investors. Projects are not correlated, so
3the moral hazard problems of the FIs and entrepreneurs. Net worth helps mitigate the
two moral hazard problems, so that the incentive-compatible conditions that prohibit
shirking are satis￿ed. Our model is built upon two costly state veri￿cation problems,
where net worth helps reduce the cost of external ￿nance, thereby increasing aggregate
investment. Second, in their models, the sum of the FIs￿net worth and entrepreneurial
net worth is most important to aggregate investment, because both net worths work
similarly in making it easier for the borrowers to borrow external funds from the market.
Thus, the role of each net worth is not emphasized. In our model, net worth distribution
across sectors also matters for the investment, because two net worths work di⁄erently
in the chain of credit contracts. Third, our model stresses the role of net worth in
a⁄ecting the borrowing rates of the credit contracts. Here, net worth a⁄ects investments
through market price movements. Consequently, the borrowing rates, net worth of the
two sectors, and aggregate investment decisions are discussed in a uni￿ed framework.
In their models, net worth mitigates the moral hazard problems, and a⁄ects investment
directly by changing the incentive compatibility conditions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model in which
both FIs and entrepreneurs are credit constrained. In Section 3, we calibrate the model
to the U.S. economy, and show the model￿ s quantitative response to sectoral shocks and
aggregate shocks. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model Economy
This section describes the structure of our model and the optimization problems that the
economy￿ s agents solve. The economy consists of a credit market and goods market, and
seven types of agents; a household, investors, FIs, entrepreneurs, capital goods producers,
￿nal goods producers and government.
The participants in the credit market are investors, FIs and entrepreneurs. Investors
are subject to perfect competition, earning zero pro￿t. They collect deposits from the
household in a competitive market, and invest what they collect as loans to FIs.3 FIs and
entrepreneurs face credit constraints, but earn positive pro￿ts, accumulating net worth.
FIs are monopolistic lenders to entrepreneurs.4 They own net worth but not enough
to ￿nance their loans to entrepreneurs. Therefore, they engage in credit contracts with
lenders can be exempt from idiosyncratic uncertainty, and without aggregate uncertainty, lenders￿ex
post pro￿ts are the same as ex ante expected pro￿ts.
3The deposit rate that the household receives from investors equals the risk-free rate. Investors may
be interpreted as being the ￿nancial institutions that act as fund suppliers to FIs in the ￿nancial market.
4We assume that the bankruptcy cost associated with investor￿ enptrepreneur credit contracts is high
enough so that there are no direct credit contracts between them. The role of FIs in our model is consis-
tent with recent views about FIs proposed in studies such as those of Allen (2001), Gorton and Winton
(2003), and Gorton (2008). In these studies, FIs￿economic activity is regarded as overwhelmingly
important and broadly described as the ￿ shadow banking system.￿
4investors in order to borrow the rest of the funds. Entrepreneurs are the ￿nal borrowers
of funds in the economy. They own net worth, but not enough to ￿nance their projects.
They thus engage in credit contracts with FIs in which they borrow the rest of the
required funds from FIs. These two contracts are chained so that the entrepreneurs
cannot ￿nance their projects if either of the credit contracts does not hold.
There are agency problems associated with asymmetric information in the credit con-
tracts between FIs and entrepreneurs (hereafter FE contracts) and the credit contracts
between investors and FIs (hereafter IF contracts). This makes the borrowing rates
dependent on the borrowers￿net worth. The contents of the two credit contracts are
chosen by monopolistic FIs, so that FIs maximize their pro￿ts, thereby ensuring the
participation constraints of entrepreneurs and investors.
The structure of our model is based on BGG. However, in BGG, FIs are not credit
constrained. FIs and investors are treated as the same institution that faces perfect
competition and earns zero pro￿t. There is only one credit contract between FIs and
entrepreneurs. Because FIs face perfect competition, in the credit contract, it is entre-
preneurs who maximize their pro￿ts, ensuring the participation constraint of FIs. FIs￿
credit conditions do not in￿ uence the content of the credit contract.
Our goods markets consist of input markets and output markets for ￿nal goods, and
capital goods markets. These markets are competitive, and prices of all goods are ￿ exible.
Final goods producers have Cobb￿ Douglas production technology that converts capital
and labor into ￿nal goods. Capital is supplied by entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs purchase
capital goods from capital goods producers using the funds they borrowed from the credit
market, and sell capital goods to the ￿nal goods producers. Labor inputs are supplied
by the household, FIs and entrepreneurs. Once produced, ￿nal goods are allocated to
consumption and investment in the competitive ￿nal goods market.
2.1 Credit Contracts and Net Worth
The Environment
There is a continuum number of investors, FIs and entrepreneurs. They sign two
types of credit contracts. There are three kinds of interest rates, R(st); RF (st) and
RE (st); that are relevant for the credit contracts, where st is state of the economy at
t. R(st) is the risk-free rate of return in the economy, RF (st) is the ex post return
on the loans to entrepreneurs, and RE (st) is the ex post aggregate return to capital.
At period t, investors collect deposits from a household for the risk-free rate in the
competitive market and lend these deposits to a continuum of FIs. Investors￿returns on
the loans to FIs are equalized to their opportunity cost given by the risk-free rate. FIs
monopolistically supply loans to a continuum of entrepreneurs. Each FI, say a type i FI,
makes loan contracts with a speci￿c group of entrepreneurs, say group ji entrepreneurs,
5that are attached to the FI.5 By lending to a continuum of group ji entrepreneurs, a
type i FI diversi￿es the loan risk associated with a speci￿c entrepreneur and obtains a
return of RF (st): Entrepreneurs are ￿nal borrowers in the economy. They invest their
loans in the purchase of capital goods and receive the return to capital RE (st):
We begin with the FE contract. At the beginning of each period, each type i FI o⁄ers
a loan contract to group ji entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur in group ji owns net worth
NE
ji (st) and purchases capital of Q(st)Kt;ji (st), where Q(st) is the price paid per unit of
capital and Kt;ji (st) is the quantity of capital purchased by a group ji entrepreneur: Fol-
lowing BGG, we assume that entrepreneurs are subject to an idiosyncratic productivity
shock !E
ji (st+1) so that the net return to capital is !E
ji (st+1)RE (st+1): The FE contract
speci￿es: (1) the amount of debt that a group ji entrepreneur borrows from a type i FI,
Q(st)Kji (st)￿NE
ji (st); (2) a cut-o⁄value of idiosyncratic shock !E
ji (st+1);which we de-
note by !E
ji (st+1jst); such that entrepreneurs repay their debt for !E
ji (st+1) ￿ !E
ji (st+1jst)
and they declare the default for !E
ji (st+1) < !E
ji (st+1jst); and (3) a loan rate that group
ji entrepreneurs repay when they do not default, ZE




ji (st+1) ￿ !E
ji (st+1jst)
￿
RE (st+1)Q(st)Kji (st) and the default
entrepreneur receives nothing from the contract. The relationship between cut-o⁄ value
!E
ji (st+1jst) and non default entrepreneurs￿loan rate ZE











































There is a participation constraint for entrepreneurs in the FE contract. Instead of
participating in the FE contract, group ji entrepreneurs can purchase capital goods using
their own net worth NE
ji (st);without participating in loan contracts with FIs. In this al-
ternative case, the ex post return to their investments equals !E
ji (st+1)RE (st+1)NE
ji (st).
Therefore, an FE contract between an FI and entrepreneurs is agreed only when the
following inequality is expected to hold








































5We assume that the bankruptcy cost associated with a credit contract between an FI other than
a type i FI and group ji entrepreneurs is high enough. Therefore, group ji entrepreneurs can borrow
funds only from a certain monopolistic FI. See Klein (1971) and Monti (1972) and Freixas and Rochet

































portion of non-defaulted entrepreneurs

































Note that 1 ￿ ￿E
t is the expected share of pro￿ts from purchasing capital goods that
goes to the borrowers in the FE contract. The left-hand side of the inequality (2) shows
the expected return from the FE contract for group ji entrepreneurs, and the right-hand
side of the inequality (2) shows the expected return from investing the entrepreneurial
net worth NE
i (st): In this paper, we focus on the case where equation (2) holds with
equality.6
The inequality (2) also gives the expression for the expected earnings of a type i FI
for each FE contract





























































ji (st+1)RE (st+1)Q(st)Kji (st); with 0 < ￿E < 1; is the ex post bank-
ruptcy cost that FIs pay whenever group ji entrepreneurs declare the default. Because
each type i FI lends a continuum number of entrepreneurs in group ji; the loan risk of
the FI is perfectly diversi￿ed. For convenience, we de￿ne the expected return on the
loans to entrepreneurs, RF (st+1jst) as
Z
ji
share of entrepreneurial earnings paid to FI i






































6For some range of parameters, this participation constraint can hold in strict inequality. In this case,




regardless of the entrepreneurial net worth.
Interestingly, in this case, the external ￿nance premium comes to depend only on the sum of the net
worth of FIs and entrepreneurs. The distribution of net worth between the two borrowing sectors has
no e⁄ect. According to parameters calibrated to the U.S. data, however, this participation constraint

































































































The left-hand side of equation (3) is the gross pro￿t that a speci￿c type i FI receives
from a continuum number of FE contracts with group ji entrepreneurs.
We next turn to the IF contract. A type i FI splits this gross pro￿t from the FE
contract with investors according to another credit contract, the IF contract. The IF con-
tract has the same costly state veri￿cation structure as the FE contract, but FIs now need
to act as the borrowers rather than lenders. In the IF contract, investors provide loans
to a continuum number of FIs. Each type i FI owns the net worth NF
i (st) and invests in
the loans to group ji entrepreneurs an amount of Q(st)Ki (st)￿NE
i (st): It then borrows
the rest Q(st)Ki (st) ￿ NF
i (st) ￿ NE
i (st) from investors, and repays the loan using its
pro￿t from the FE contracts. We assume that each type i FI is subject to idiosyncratic
productivity shock !F
i (st+1) 7 and its ex post gross return on the loans to entrepreneurs is
given by !F
i (st+1)RF (st+1): Here, the IF contract speci￿es: (1) the amount of debt that
a type i FI borrows from investors, Q(st)Ki (st)￿NE
i (st)￿NF
i (st); (2) a cut-o⁄value of
idiosyncratic shock !F
i (st+1); which we denote by !F
i (st+1jst); such that FIs repay their
debt for !F
i (st+1) ￿ !F
i (st+1jst) and declare the default for !F
i (st+1) < !F
i (st+1jst); and
(3) the return rate of the loan when the type i FI does not default, ZF
i (st+1jst): Here,
ex post, non-default FI i receives
￿
!F
i (st+1) ￿ !F
i (st+1jst)
￿
RF (st+1)Q(st)Ki (st) and
default FI receives nothing from the contract. The relationship between cut-o⁄ value
!F
i (st+1jst) and non default FIs￿loan rate ZF





















































7The FI￿ s idiosyncratic productivity shock !F
i is associated with the shock in bankruptcy costs,
technology of ￿nancing short-term assets and liabilities, or the quality of borrowers in the FE contract,
which di⁄ers across FIs. We assume that two variables !E
ji and !F
i are unit mean, lognormal random
variables distributed independently over time and across entrepreneurs and FIs. We express the density




































; denoted by ￿E
t and ￿F
t ; respectively, are stochastic processes.
8Similar to the FE contract, there is a participation constraint for the investors in the
IF contract. Given the risk-free rate of return in the economy R(st); investors￿pro￿t
from the investment in the loans to FIs must equal the opportunity cost of lending. That
is
share of FIs￿earnings paid to investors

































































































portion of non-defaulted FIs










































share of FIs earnings paid to FIs
































where ￿(st+1jst) is the probability weight for state st+1; depending on the information
set available at period t:
Optimal Credit Contract
Type i FI maximizes their expected pro￿t (6) by optimally choosing the variables !F
i ;
Ki; !E
ji; Kji; subject to the investors￿participation constraint (5) and entrepreneurial










































































































































From the ￿rst-order condition (7) and the two participation constraints, (5) and
(2); we can derive the following relation for FIs￿optimal choice of capital Q(st)K (st);




, FIs￿own net worth NF (st)






































ratio of the debt to the size of the capital investment




















t (st) and nE
t (st) are the ratio of each of FIs￿net worth and entrepreneurial net
worth to the total amount of capital. The aggregation of the FIs and the entrepreneurs
becomes tractable, because the ratio of net worth to capital is the same across the FIs,
and across the entrepreneurs.
This equation is the key to the model, which describes the relationship between the
two net worths NF
t (st) and NE






10Because RE (st+1) corresponds to the return from capital investment, a higher external
￿nance premium implies lower capital investment. It is notable that each net worth as
well as the sum of the net worths are important determinants of the external ￿nance pre-
mium. The third term on the right-hand side of the equation indicates that the external
￿nance premium decreases with the sum of the net worth held by the two borrowing
sectors. This is because if the leverage of the IF and FE contracts is low, the investors
do not require high returns from the contract. In addition, the ￿rst and the second
terms on the right-hand side of the equation make each net worth as well as the sum
of the two net worths a⁄ect the external ￿nance premium separately. As FIs￿net worth
and entrepreneurial net worth work di⁄erently through the two credit contracts, they
in￿ uence the external ￿nance premium nonlinearly. Below we display the relationship
S (￿), using numerical exercises. We ￿rst study the relationship between each of the two
net worths NF
t (st) and NE
t (st); and the external ￿nance premium: We then investigate
how the relative size of the two net worths, or equivalently, the distribution of net worth
across the two sectors, is related to the external ￿nance premium.
Cost-of-Funds Curve
Figure 1 displays the cost-of-funds curve in our economy. This curve presents the rela-
tionship between the external ￿nance premium, or equivalently, the expected discounted
return to capital, and the net worth/capital ratio in each of the sectors, based on the
function S (￿):8 The net worth/capital ratio in each sector is depicted on the horizontal
axis, and the external ￿nance premium is depicted on the vertical axis. In the left panel
of Figure 1, we show the values of the external ￿nance premium for various sizes of the
FIs￿net worth/capital ratio, maintaining a constant entrepreneurial net worth/capital
ratio.
According to the panel, the external ￿nance premium is decreasing in the FIs￿net
worth/capital ratio. As capital investment increases relative to the FIs￿net worth, the
expected bankruptcy costs associated with the IF contract rise. This is demonstrated in
the top left panel of Figure 2. In contrast, a fall in the FIs￿net worth does not a⁄ect
the expected default cost of the FE contract, because the entrepreneurs￿participation
constraint is independent from the FIs￿net worth. Given higher expected bankruptcy
costs, a marginal increase in the capital investment is pro￿table to FIs only if the expected
discounted return to capital is high enough.
Another important feature of this curve is the role of the net worth held by entre-
preneurs. As the right panel of Figure 1 indicates, the external ￿nance premium is also
decreasing in the entrepreneurial net worth/capital ratio. The bottom right panel of
8For the exercises displayed in Figures 1 and 2, we set the model parameters pertaining to the two
credit contracts following BGG. Namely, we set the values for parameters ￿E;￿E and 1 ￿ ￿E equal to
the values of the bankruptcy cost, variance of entrepreneurial idiosyncratic productivity and death rate
reported in BGG, respectively. We further assume that ￿F = ￿E;￿F = ￿F and ￿F = ￿E so that the
two credit contracts are symmetric in terms of these parameters.
11Figure 2 shows that a rise in entrepreneurial net worth reduces the expected default cost
associated with the FE contract, reducing the cost of capital investment. Furthermore,
the bottom left panel of Figure 2 suggests that the expected default cost of the IF con-
tract decreases with entrepreneurial net worth. Because the two credit contracts are
chained, the decline of the entrepreneurial default probability increases the return of the
loan to the FIs, making the FIs￿default probability lower, too.
We next discuss the role of the net worth distribution. Unlike BGG, our net worth
is distributed across two distinct sectors. Because the two net worths contribute to the
two credit contracts di⁄erently, the relative size of the each net worth is important to
the capital investment. Figure 3 displays the share of the net worth held by the FI
sector on the horizontal axis and the external ￿nance premium on the vertical axis. We
set the ratio of total net worth to the total amount of capital investment equal to .6,
and investigate how the external ￿nance premium changes with an increase in the FIs￿
share. The solid line in the two panels of Figure 3 represents the cost-of-funds curve,
which gives the relationship between the share and the external ￿nance premium when
the bankruptcy costs and the variance of idiosyncratic productivity are symmetric across
the two contracts.9
We ￿nd that the cost-of-funds curve is U-shaped with respect to the FIs￿share. The
required expected discounted return to capital is decreasing in the FI￿ s share, when the
share is smaller than 40%, and it is increasing in the share, when the share is above 40%.
The curve implies that it is pro￿table for the FIs to conduct smaller capital investment
even when entrepreneurial (FIs￿ ) net worth is large, if the net worth held by the FI
(entrepreneurs) sector is very small.10 Consequently, the net worth in a sector that owns
a smaller amount of net worth a⁄ects the capital size disproportionately.
Figure 4 illustrates this point in more detail. In the region where the FIs￿share is
small, the expected default cost of the IF contract declines signi￿cantly and that of the
FE contract increases moderately with the FIs￿net worth. On the other hand, in the
region where the FIs￿share is large, the expected default cost of the IF contract decreases
moderately while that of the FE contract increases signi￿cantly with the FIs￿net worth.
Admittedly, this property is not independent from how the expected default costs of
the contracts are related to the net worth/capital ratio of the borrowers. We therefore
discuss the cases in which the size of the bankruptcy cost or the distribution of borrowers￿
idiosyncratic productivity is di⁄erent across the contracts. First, we study the case in
which entrepreneurial bankruptcy cost is higher, ￿E = ￿ = 2￿F; and vice versa. The
lines with black circles in Figures 3 and 4 show the case when ￿E = ￿ = 2￿F. Here, the
9Here, we set ￿F = ￿E = ￿ and ￿F = ￿E = ￿; where ￿ and ￿ are the bankruptcy cost and the
variance used in BGG.
10The external ￿nance premium is lowest when the FIs￿share is not 50% but around 40%. This
indicates asymmetry between the two net worths, re￿ ecting that the two credit contracts are not hor-
izontally but vertically chained. Quantitatively, however, the e⁄ect of this asymmetry on the external
￿nance premium is small compared with the e⁄ect of the asymmetry coming from bankruptcy costs and
variance of idiosyncratic shocks discussed in the next section.
12external ￿nance premium is increasing with the FIs￿net worth share. The higher the FIs￿
share is, the lower the FIs￿default probability and the higher the entrepreneurial default
probability. This is because a rise in the default cost of entrepreneurs in the FE contract
dominates a decline in the default cost of the FIs in the IF contract. Consequently, FIs
require a higher expected discounted return to capital as net worth is more distributed
to the FI sector. The dashed lines with black circles in the upper panel of Figures 3 and
4 show the opposite case. In this case, the external ￿nance premium is decreasing with
the FIs￿net worth share by a similar but opposite mechanism.
Finally, we discuss the case in which the variance of borrowers￿idiosyncratic produc-
tivity is di⁄erent between the IF contract and FE contract. We study the case in which
the variance of the FIs￿idiosyncratic productivity is higher, ￿F = ￿ = 2￿E; and the
opposite case, ￿E = ￿ = 2￿F: Figures 5 and 6 present the outcomes of these exercises.
Similar to the results for changing bankruptcy costs, asymmetric variances across the
two borrowers shift the cost-of-funds curve downwards. However, in contrast to the case
of changing bankruptcy costs, the U-shape of the curve is only slightly modi￿ed under
changes of variances across credit contracts.
Dynamic Behavior of Net Worth
The net worths of FIs and entrepreneurs, NF (st) and NE (st); depend on their
earnings from the credit contracts and their labor income. In addition to the pro￿ts from
entrepreneurial projects, both FIs and entrepreneurs inelastically supply a unit of labor
to ￿nal goods producers and receive labor income W F (st) and W E (st).11 We assume
that each FI and entrepreneur survives to the next period with a constant probability





































































































FIs and entrepreneurs that fail to survive at period t consume
￿
1 ￿ ￿F￿
V F (st) and ￿
1 ￿ ￿E￿
V E (st); respectively.
11See BGG and CMR for the technical reason for this speci￿cation.
132.2 Rest of the Economy
Household
A representative household is in￿nitely lived, and maximizes the following utility























































where C (st) is ￿nal goods consumption, H (st) is hours worked, D(st) is real deposits
held by investors, W (st) is the real wage measured by the ￿nal goods; R(st) is the
real risk-free return from the deposit D(st) between time t and t + 1; and T (st) is the
lump-sum transfer. ￿ 2 (0;1); ￿ and ￿ are the subjective discount factor, the elasticity
of leisure, and the utility weight on leisure.


























Final goods producers are price takers in both input markets and output markets.
They hire three types of labor inputs: H (st); HF (st) and HE (st); from a household,
FIs and entrepreneurs, and pay real wages W (st); W F (st) and W E (st) to each type
of labor input, respectively. Capital K (st￿1) is supplied from entrepreneurs with rental
price RE (st): At the end of each period, the capital is sold back to entrepreneurs at































































































denotes the level of
technology of ￿nal goods production. ￿ 2 (0;1], ￿; ￿E and ￿F are the depreciation
rate of capital goods, the capital share, the share of FIs￿labor inputs and the share of
















(1 ￿ ￿) = 0; (14)

























Capital goods producers own technology that converts ￿nal goods to capital goods.
They sell capital goods in a competitive market with price Q(st￿1): At each period, the
capital goods producers purchase I (st) amount of ￿nal goods from ￿nal goods producers.
They also receive K (st￿1)(1 ￿ ￿) of used capital goods from the ￿nal goods producers
at price Q(st￿1). They then produce capital goods K (st); using technology FI: The





























































Note that ￿ is a parameter that is associated with investment adjustment cost.12
12Equation (18) does not have a term for used capital Kt￿1 that is sold by entrepreneurs at the end of
the last period. This is because, following BGG, we assume that the price of capital that entrepreneurs
sell to the capital goods producers at the end of the period, say Qt; is close to the price of newly produced
capital Qt around the steady state.
15Because capital depreciates at each period, the evolvement of total capital available



























The government collects a lump-sum tax from a household T (st); and spends G(st).





































































































































































Note that the fourth and the ￿fth terms on the right-hand side of the equation correspond
to the bankruptcy costs spent by FIs and the household, respectively.
Exogenous Variables
The exogenous shocks to the model, that is, the technology shock, the shocks to
the standard error of the idiosyncratic productivity of the FIs, and the shocks to the












































where ￿A; ￿￿E and ￿￿F 2 (0;1) are autoregressive roots of the exogenous variables,
and "A (st);"￿E (st) and "￿F (st) are innovations that are mutually independent, serially






An equilibrium consists of a set of prices, fR(st); RF (st); RE (st);W (st); W F (st);
W E (st); Q(st); RF (st+1jst); RE (st+1jst);ZF (st+1jst);ZE (st+1jst)g1














fY (st); C (st);D(st); I (st); K (st); H (st)gg1
t=0; for a given government policy fG(st);T (st)g1
t=0,
realization of exogenous variables f"A (st);"￿E (st);"￿F (st)g1





ji=1; fK￿1g such that for all t; i; ji and h : (i) the household max-
imizes its utility given the prices; (ii) the FIs maximize their pro￿ts given the prices;
(iii) the entrepreneurs maximize their pro￿ts given the prices; (iv) ￿nal goods produc-
ers maximize their pro￿ts given the prices; (v) capital goods producers maximizes their
pro￿t given the prices; (vi) the government budget constraint holds; (vii) and markets
clear.
3 Simulation
To study the quantitative relationships between the external ￿nance premium and net
worth of borrowing sectors, we ￿rst calibrate the parameters to the U.S. data. Our
calibration reveals that the cost-of-funds curve is a decreasing function of the share of
the FIs￿net worth in the United States. Next, we calculate the steady state of the model,
and linearize the equilibrium conditions (7), (9), (10), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17) and
(19) around the steady state. We then compute the equilibrium response of the economy
to the adverse shocks that are commonly analyzed in the literature. We study ￿ve types
of adverse shocks: (1) a net worth shock in the FI sector, (2) a net worth shock in the
entrepreneurial sector, (3) a shock to the standard error of idiosyncratic productivity
in the FI sector, (4) a shock to the standard error of idiosyncratic productivity in the
entrepreneurial sector, and (5) a shock to the technology in the ￿nal goods sector. (1),
(2), (3) and (4) are sectoral shocks that hit each of the participants in the credit market,
and (5) is an aggregate shock. For the ￿rst two shocks, we introduce an innovation
either in equation (9) or (10); following Gilchrist and Leahy (2002). The other shocks
are illustrated in the equations (23);(24) and (22); by "￿F (st); "￿E (st) and "A (st):
Hereafter, we call the shock to the standard error of borrowers￿idiosyncratic productivity
the ￿riskiness shock,￿following the terminology of CMR.13 The riskiness shock, to our
knowledge, was ￿rst introduced in the ￿nancial accelerator model of CMR. We assume
that both FIs and entrepreneurs are subject to this riskiness shock.
The quantitative exercises illustrate the relationship between the ￿nancial accelerator
e⁄ect and the nature of the two credit contracts. In particular, our analysis reveals how
the FIs￿credit constraint a⁄ects the propagation and ampli￿cation mechanism. Using
13Bernanke (1983) and Bernanke and Blinder (1988) argue that the Great Depression partly stemmed
from the increased riskiness of loans.
17the model calibrated to the U.S. economy, which we call the ￿baseline model,￿we conduct
the following three separate exercises.
First, we compare our calibrated model with an alternative model in which only
entrepreneurs are credit constrained and FIs are not constrained. We call this model
the ￿BGG model.￿This model can be considered as a special case of our baseline model
in which the credit friction of the IF contract is negligibly small. By comparing the
economic responses to adverse shocks under the BGG model and baseline model, we
isolate the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect coming from the IF contract.
Second, we compare the macroeconomic consequences of a sectoral shock to the FI
sector with those of a sectoral shock to the entrepreneurial sector. The comparison
between the two shocks illustrates the relative signi￿cance of the two borrowing sectors
in the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism.
Third, we study the model￿ s response to the aggregate adverse shock. We again
compare our baseline model with now alternative models in which the net worth across
sectors is allocated di⁄erently from that under the baseline model. By comparing the
economic responses to the aggregate shock, we show the quantitative role of the net
worth distribution in the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism.
3.1 Calibration
We choose several parameter values used in BGG for our benchmark model. These in-
clude, the quarterly discount factor ￿; labor supply elasticity ￿; capital share ￿; quarterly
depreciation rate ￿; and steady state share of government expenditure in total output
G=Y: We set values for six parameters that are linked to the IF contract and FE contract
so that these values are consistent with the following seven conditions. These are (1)
the risk spread, RE ￿ R; equals to 200 basis points annually; (2) the ratio of net worth
held by FIs to capital, NF=QK, is .1, which is close to the actual value according to
the data;14 (3) the ratio of net worth held by entrepreneurs to capital, NE=QK, is .5,
the approximate value in the data; (4) the annualized failure rate of FIs is 2%;15 and
(5) the annualized failure rate of entrepreneurs is 2%. Conditions (1), (3), and (5) are
the same as those used in BGG. Two more conditions are set so as to be approximately
consistent with the U.S. data: (6) the spread between the FIs￿loan rate and the FIs￿
borrowing rate ZE ￿ ZF equals 230 basis points annually, which equals the historical
average spread between the prime lending rate and the six-month certi￿cates of deposit
rate from 1980 to 2006; and (7) the spread between the FIs￿borrowing rate and risk-
14We calculate the steady state value of NE=QK based on the Flow of Fund data, released by the
Federal Reserve Board. We calculate the historical series of the sum of corporate equities and equity
in noncorporate business held by ￿nancial sectors divided by total liability and equity of non￿nancial
business sector, and set at the steady state value of .1 for NE=QK, which is the historical average from
1990 to 2005.
15Although the FI￿ s failure rate may seem to be lower than the entrepreneur￿ s failure rate, we set
them to this value based on the observation of the CDS premium data during the recent crisis periods.
18free rate ZF ￿ R equals 60 basis points annually, which turns out to be approximately
the historical average spread between the six-month certi￿cates of deposit rate and the
six-month treasury bill rate from 1980 to 2006.
The estimated parameters from these steady state conditions include the lenders￿
bankruptcy cost in the IF contract ￿F, the lenders￿bankruptcy cost in the FE contract
￿E; the standard error of the idiosyncratic productivity shock in the FI sector ￿F
t , the
standard error of the idiosyncratic productivity shock in the entrepreneurial sector ￿E
t ,
the survival rate of FIs ￿F and survival rate of entrepreneurs ￿E. See Appendices B and
C for details.16
3.2 Cost-of-Funds Curve
Figure 7 displays the quantitative relationships between the external ￿nance premium
and net worth distribution, under parameters consistent with the U.S. economy. The
U.S. cost-of-funds curve looks like a mixture of the curves shown in the sections above.
Two observations are worth noting. First, in the current U.S. economy, the external
￿nance premium decreases with the share of the FIs￿net worth, because the share of
the FIs￿net worth is 0.1/(0.1+0.5)=0.17. Second, the ￿gure is U-shaped and similar to
those depicted by the solid line in Figures 3 and 5, but this curve is tilted to the right.
As a result, the external ￿nance premium decreases with the FIs￿share for a wider range
of share values.
This observation stems from the di⁄erence in the bankruptcy costs between FIs and
entrepreneurs. According to the U.S. data, the spread between the FIs￿loan rate and the
FIs￿borrowing rate, ZE ￿ ZF; is on average three times larger than the spread between
the FIs￿borrowing rate and risk-free rate ZF ￿ R: It implies that the bankruptcy cost
of the FIs is more expensive than that of entrepreneurs.
3.3 Comparison with BGG Model
We ￿rst compare the quantitative implications of our baseline model with those of the
￿BGG model.￿Here, our goal is to isolate the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect coming from the
FI sector from that coming from the entrepreneurial sector. To make a fair comparison
between the two models, we newly construct a ￿BGG model￿ that di⁄ers from the
baseline model only in terms of credit market settings. The FI sector is dropped from
this BGG model, and the investors and entrepreneurs make direct credit contracts in the
same manner as in the model of BGG.17 Because there is no agency problem associated
16Lenders￿bankruptcy cost associated with entrepreneurs, ￿E; is 0.013. This number is much smaller
than that in BGG, 0.12. This is because we use the same risk spread (200 basis points) as BGG, while
our model incorporates additional credit frictions in the FI sector.
17The di⁄erences from the original BGG model are that (i) we assume that all goods prices are ￿ exible,
and (ii) we set parameter values equal to our baseline model.
19with the FIs, the FIs￿net worth plays no role. Thus the external ￿nance premium
re￿ ects only the entrepreneurial net worth or entrepreneurial riskiness. Consequently,
the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect of the BGG model comes only from the entrepreneurial
sector.18
Figure 8 presents the results of this exercise. The upper panels display the responses
of the endogenous variables to the net worth shocks under the two models. We consider
the case where each sector of the two models is subject to an unexpected, once-and-for-
all decline in the net worth of .01 units of its steady state value. The line with black
circles denotes the response of the baseline model to a .01 units exogenous decline in the
FIs￿net worth. The dotted and solid lines denote the models￿response to a .01 units
exogenous decline in the entrepreneurial net worth, under our baseline economy and our
BGG model, respectively.
The middle panels display the economic responses to the positive riskiness shocks.




exogenously jumps up at the initial period
by 1%, and gradually returns to its steady state exogenously at the rate of ￿￿F (st) ￿
￿￿E (st)
￿
following equations (23) and (24): The lines with black circles denotes the
response of the baseline model to an increase in the FIs￿riskiness ￿F (st). The dotted
and solid lines denote the models￿response to an increase in entrepreneurial riskiness
￿E (st), under our baseline economy and under our BGG model.19
Lastly, the lower panels display the responses of endogenous variables to the negative
technology shock. We consider the case where the productivity of ￿nal goods drops at
the initial period then gradually returns to its steady state at the rate of ￿A: The line
with black circles denotes the response of the baseline model. The dotted line denotes
the model￿ s response under our BGG model.
Comparing the economic responses to the net worth shock, the e⁄ect of the shock
to the FI sector under the baseline model is the largest, and that to the entrepreneurial
sector under the BGG model is the smallest. In response to the negative technology
shock, the e⁄ect on the external ￿nance premium and investment is larger under the
baseline model than under the BGG model. The e⁄ect of the FIs￿riskiness shock is
also larger under the baseline model while that of the entrepreneurial riskiness shock is
almost equivalent but slightly smaller under the baseline model than the BGG model.20
18We set parameter values related to the entrepreneurial sector in our BGG model to the same values
used in our baseline model. Thus we set the values of ￿E; ￿E; and nE the same across the two models.
Furthermore, we choose the same steady state return to capital RE for the two models. We choose to
do so because we aim to compare the models￿dynamics in a similar economic environment with respect
to aggregate investment. Our choice yields the recalibrated values of ￿E and R for the BGG model,
which di⁄er from the baseline model.
19In this experiment, for comparison, we set the size of the riskiness shock to 1% of its steady state
level for FIs and entrepreneurs. An alternative is to give the same size shock to the two sectors. Because
the calibrated value of ￿F is lower than that of ￿E, this alternative yields an even larger response of
the external ￿nance premium and investment to the FIs￿riskiness shock than to the entrepreneurial
riskiness shock.
20For sensitivity analysis, we also compare our baseline model with the BGG model which is calibrated
20To summarize, the existence of the agency problem in the FI sector drastically a⁄ects
the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect. In response to the technology shock, our model yields
larger movements of endogenous variables, suggesting the importance of the FI sector
as an ampli￿er of the exogenous shocks. In our credit market, the IF contract works
together with the FE contract, to reinforce the credit market imperfection, making the
economic response larger.
In terms of the shocks to the credit market, shocks to the FI sector are more mag-
ni￿ed compared with those to the entrepreneurial sector in both models, suggesting the
importance of the FI sector as a source of the ￿ uctuations. In addition, our simulation
implies that the sectoral shock to the entrepreneurial sector may also be magni￿ed by the
presence of the credit-constrained FIs. In response to the net worth shock to the entre-
preneurial sector, the model with the IF contract generates a larger response compared
with the BGG model.
In the next two sections, we look more closely at our baseline model￿ s response to
sectoral shocks (shocks to the credit market) and the technology shock.
3.4 Shocks to the Credit Market
We next discuss the propagation and ampli￿cation mechanism of our model, in response
to two types of sectoral shocks, net worth shocks and riskiness shocks. We ￿rst consider
an experiment where the baseline economy is subject to an unexpected, once-and-for-all
decline of the FIs￿net worth by .01 units of net worth. The solid line in Figure 9 presents
the economy￿ s response to the shock under the baseline model. In response to the shock,
the entrepreneurial net worth as well as FIs￿net worth decreases. As the two net worths
decline, the external ￿nance premium rises, reducing the aggregate investment. These
endogenous developments of the net worths decrease the FIs￿net worth further, which
magni￿es the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect.
For comparison, we simulate the economy￿ s response to the once-and-for-all decline
in the entrepreneurial net worth by .01 units of net worth, using a dashed line in Figure
9. This shock generates qualitatively similar dynamics as those for the FI sector. Its
quantitative impacts are, however, relatively moderate. The reason for this asymmetry
is the bias of the net worth distribution. Recall in Figure 7 that the e⁄ect of a one-
unit change of the FIs￿net worth on the external ￿nance premium dominates that of
the entrepreneurial net worth, when the net worth distribution is biased toward the
entrepreneurial sector as it is in the United States.
Similarly, we conduct an experiment where the baseline economy is subjected to an
unexpected, 1% increase in the FIs￿riskiness ￿F (st) and entrepreneurial riskiness ￿E (st):
Figure 10 shows that for both shocks, an increase in the riskiness generates a decrease in
in a di⁄erent manner (not reported). We set the same value of the riskfree rate R across the models,
and set di⁄erent values of the steady state RE for the two models. The economic responses of this BGG
model are qualitatively similar to the BGG model that is calibrated di⁄erently.
21the capital goods price Q(st) : As (14) implies, it reduces the return to capital, resulting
in a decrease of the capital investment demand. The asymmetry is also observed in
the riskiness shock. The quantitative impacts of the FIs￿riskiness shock on aggregate
variables are, however, larger than those of the entrepreneurial riskiness shock.
To see the source of the asymmetry, we consider another two alternative economies
with di⁄erent initial net worth distributions. In the ￿rst economy, we distribute the net
worth across sectors equally.21 In the second economy, we distribute more net worth to
the FI sector. Figure 11 demonstrates the responses of investment to the four adverse
shocks, under economies with three di⁄erent net worth distributions. The solid line with
black circles depicts the model￿ s response under the baseline net worth distribution.
The solid line depicts the case in which net worths are equally distributed, so that
nF (st) = nE (st) = 0:3. The dotted line depicts the case in which the net worth is
distributed more to the FIs￿sector, so that nF (st) = 0:5 and nE (st) = 0:1: The ￿gure
indicates that the propagation of the FIs￿shock is drastically reduced as more net worth
is distributed to the FIs, while that of the entrepreneurial shock increases. Because the
agency problems of the FI sector are mitigated, propagation of the FIs￿shocks becomes
smaller.
3.5 Technology Shock
Lastly, we consider an experiment where the baseline economy is subject to an unex-
pected temporary decrease in productivity in the ￿nal goods sector. The solid line with
black circles in Figure 12 presents the economy￿ s response to the shock. As equation (14)
implies, this productivity shock decreases the ex post discounted return to capital. Con-
sequently, the expected demand for the capital goods drops, causing the capital goods
price Q(st) to fall. Through the same mechanism in the previous subsection, the net
worths of the two sectors decline, causing a rise in the external ￿nance premium that
drives down the aggregate investment.
Similar to the sectoral shocks, the magni￿cation of the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect
in response to the productivity shock is a⁄ected by the net worth distribution. We
compare the baseline model with the alternative two models we studied in the previous
section. The solid line in Figure 12 depicts the case in which the initial net worth is
equally distributed across sectors. The dotted line in the ￿gure depicts the case in which
more net worth is distributed to the FI sector. Clearly, as the FIs have relatively higher
net worth, the ampli￿cation e⁄ect is less enhanced. As Figure 7 indicates, the cost-of-
funds curve in the U.S. economy is tilted to the right and the external ￿nance premium
21In order to focus on the e⁄ect of the net worth distribution, we hold all the technology and distrib-
ution parameters pertaining to the credit contracts, two bankruptcy costs ￿F; ￿E and two variances of
borrowers￿idiosyncratic productivities ￿F;￿E ￿xed at the values of the baseline model. We re-calculate
the survival rates of the FIs and entrepreneurs ￿F and ￿E for each of the three models so that all of
the equilibrium conditions (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), (9), (10) and the model-speci￿c net worth distribution
hold at the steady state.
22decreases as more net worth is distributed to the FIs, being consistent with the three
lines in Figure 12.
4 Conclusion
Empirical evidence suggests that the net worth in the FI sector and the credit frictions
associated with the FI sector a⁄ect macroeconomic activity in a signi￿cant way. Based
on the ￿nancial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999), we developed a dynamic
general equilibrium model in which FIs as well as entrepreneurs are subject to credit
constraints. In this model, the credit conditions of the two borrowing sectors, especially
borrowers￿net worths, work as the key determinants of the market borrowing rates,
because of the agency problems in the credit market. The two net worths function
di⁄erently through the chained credit contracts. Therefore the size and cross-sectional
distribution of the net worths play an important role in this process. Consequently, the
dynamics of aggregate investment depend crucially on the credit conditions of each of
the borrowing sectors.
Based on a model calibrated to U.S. data, we studied how that propagation and
ampli￿cation mechanism of the credit market changes by explicitly incorporating a credit-
constrained FI sector into the model. We found the following novel properties. First,
the FI sector enhances the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect in response to the aggregate shocks
and net worth shocks, compared with an economy that omits the credit friction in the
FI sector ￿ la BGG. Second, adverse shocks to the FI sector cause larger economic
downturns than the adverse shocks to the entrepreneurial sector. Third, ampli￿cation
of the aggregate shock can be reduced if the net worth distribution is changed from the
current distribution. These properties stem from the fact that the cross-sectional net
worth distribution is important in determining the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect, and that
its current distribution in the United States is unequally biased to the entrepreneurial
sector.
Our results have policy implications for governmental initiatives during the ￿nan-
cial crisis. For example, confronting the ￿nancial crisis starting in 2007, several OECD
countries, including the United States and Japan, have injected public funds into ￿-
nancial institutions or entrepreneurs, aimed at stabilizing the ￿nancial markets. Other
things being equal, our results suggest that capital injection would be more e⁄ective in
revitalizing aggregate investment, when FIs are targeted rather than entrepreneurs.22
22Admittedly, however, it is uncertain whether the capital injection policy improves social welfare,
without measuring the social welfare under each policy. In Hirakata, Sudo, and Ueda (2009), we in-
vestigated the welfare implications of the capital injections to FIs and to entrepreneurs, and for several
classes of monetary policy rules, using a version of the current model.
23A Analytical Expressions for the Variables Appear-
ing in the Credit Contracts

























and their di⁄erentials with respect to their cut-o⁄ values. Following BGG and
CMR, we assume that both !F
t and !E







































are the expected return from the default FIs (the
default entrepreneurs) for the IF contract (the FE contract). Using the assumptions
about the distribution of !F
t and !E































































are functions of the current value of time-varying risk-
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are the net share of pro￿t going to investors (FIs) in the IF contract



















































































































































































































This appendix provides parameterization of the variables associated with the house-
hold, wholesalers, capital goods producers, retailers, ￿nal goods producers, government
and monetary authority. Following earlier studies including BGG and CMR, we choose
conventional values for these parameters.
Parameters23
Parameter Value Description
￿ .99 Discount Factor
￿ .025 Depreciation rate
￿ .35 Capital share
R .99￿1 Risk-free rate
￿ 3 Elasticity of labor
￿ .3 Utility weight on leisure
￿ 2.5 Investment adjustment cost
￿a; ￿￿F; ￿￿E .85 Autoregressive parameters of shocks
23Figures are quarterly unless otherwise stated.
26C Parameterization II
This appendix provides parameterization of the variables that are related to the credit
contracts among investors, FIs and entrepreneurs. We choose six parameters so that
they are consistent with the equilibrium conditions (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), (9) and (10)
evaluated using the steady state values for the risk-free rate R; FIs￿loan rate ZE; FIs￿







, entrepreneurial net worth/capital ratio nE and FIs￿net worth/capital ratio nF
shown in the lower table.
Calibrated parameters24
Parameter Value Description
￿F 0.107366 S.E. of FIs idiosyncratic productivity at steady state
￿E 0.312687 S.E. of entrepreneurial idiosyncratic productivity at steady state
￿F 0.033046 Bankruptcy cost associated with FIs
￿E 0.013123 Bankruptcy cost associated with entrepreneurs
￿F 0.963286 Survival rate of FIs
￿E 0.983840 Survival rate of entrepreneurs
Steady state conditions
Condition Description
R =.99￿1 Risk-free rate is the inverse of the subjective discount factor.
ZE = ZF + :023:25 Premium for FIs￿loan rate is :023:25:








= :02 Default probability in the FE contract is .02:
nF = :1 FIs￿net worth/capital ratio is set to .1
nE = :5 Entrepreneurial net worth/capital ratio is set to .5.
24Figures are quarterly unless otherwise stated.
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Figure 1. E⁄ect of the net worth in the FI sector (left panel)
and in the entrepreneurial sector (right panel). The ratio of net
worth to capital in each sector is depicted on the horizontal axis













































Default Cost in FE contract
Figure 2. E⁄ect of the net worth in the FI sector (left panel)
and in the entrepreneurial sector (right panel). The ratio of net
worth to capital in each sector is depicted on the horizontal axis
and the expected default rate is depicted on the vertical axis.































Figure 3. E⁄ect of net worth distribution on the external ￿nance
premium. The ratio of FIs￿net worth over total net worth is
depicted on the horizontal axis and the external ￿nance
premium is depicted on the vertical axis. The solid line depicts
the case in which bankruptcy costs and variances of
idiosyncratic productivities are symmetric in the IF contract and
the FE contract. The solid line with black circles (dashed line)
depicts the case in which FIs￿(entrepreneurial) bankruptcy cost

















































Figure 4. E⁄ect of net worth distribution on the expected
default costs. The share of FIs￿net worth over total net worth is
depicted on the horizontal axis and the expected default cost of
the IF contracts (FE contracts) is depicted on the vertical axis
in the left (right) panel. The solid line illustrates the case in
which bankruptcy costs and variances of idiosyncratic
productivities are symmetric in the IF and the FE contracts.
The solid line with black circles (dashed line) depicts the case in
which the FIs￿(entrepreneurial) bankruptcy cost is lower than
that of the entrepreneurial (FIs￿ ) bankruptcy cost.






























Figure 5. E⁄ect of net worth distribution on the external ￿nance
premium. The share of the FIs￿net worth over the total net
worth is depicted on the horizontal axis and the external ￿nance
premium is depicted on the vertical axis. The solid line
illustrates the case in which bankruptcy costs and the variances
of the idiosyncratic productivities are symmetric in the IF and
the FE contracts. The solid line with black circles (dashed line)
shows the case in which the variance of the FIs￿


















































Figure 6. E⁄ect of net worth distribution on the expected
default costs. The share of the FIs￿net worth over the total net
worth is depicted on the horizontal axis and the expected
default cost of the IF contract (the FE contract) is depicted on
the vertical axis in the left (right) panel. The solid line with
black circles (dashed line) illustrates the case in which the
variance of the FIs￿(entrepreneurial) idiosyncratic productivity
is lower than that of the entrepreneurs (FIs).




















Figure 7. E⁄ect of the net worth distribution on the external
￿nance premium. ￿F;￿E;￿F and ￿E are calibrated to the US
economy. The y-axis denotes the external ￿nance premium and
the x-axis denotes the share of the FIs￿net worth over the total
net worth.
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Figure 8. Impulse responses of the endogenous variables to adverse shocks under baseline model
and our BGG model. The upper panels display the responses to the shocks to net worth, the
middle panels display the responses to the shocks to riskiness, and the lower panels display the
responses to the shocks to the productivity of ￿nal goods production.
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Figure 9. E⁄ect of the net worth shocks. Impulse responses of the endogenous variables to a
once-and-for-all decline (NF shock, NE shock, respectively) are depicted on the vertical axis.
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Figure 10. E⁄ect of riskiness shocks. Impulse responses of the endogenous variables to a positive
riskiness shock in FIs and entrepreneurs (￿F shock, ￿E shock, respectively) are depicted on the
y-axis.
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Figure 11. E⁄ect of the net worth distribution on the sectoral shock-propagation mechanism of
the credit market. Impulse responses of investment after an unexpected decline in the FIs￿net
worth (upper left panel), an unexpected decline in the entrepreneurial net worth (upper right
panel), an unexpected rise in the FIs￿riskiness (lower right panel) and an unexpected rise in the
entrepreneurial riskiness (lower right panel) are depicted.
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Figure 12. E⁄ect of the net worth distribution on the aggregate ampli￿cation mechanism of the
credit market. Impulse response of the endogenous variables to a temporary decline in the
productivity of the ￿nal goods sector are depicted on the vertical axis.
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